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THE WARREN COURT AND THE 
POLITICAL PROCESS 
William M. Beaney* 
I. THE COURT BEFORE WARREN 
OUR complex political system creates endless opportunity to debate the proper roles and powers of each of our principal 
political institutions. Students of the Supreme Court who quarrel 
over the proper role of the Court sometimes forget that the powers 
of the President and the proper place of Congress have also been 
subject to fierce controversy throughout our history, and that the 
political tension between the national government and the states 
has provided a persistent theme from the beginning of the Republic. 
It must never be forgotten that the system provided by the Framers 
was not designed to produce efficient government, but rather was 
intended, through the positing of power against power, to create a 
"free" government, one in which property and the other minority 
rights might be reasonably secure against the weight of popular 
majorities. Yet, they did not-and in the nature of things they could 
not-set forth a detailed permanent model, one in which the role of 
each of our great political institutions was rigorously defined for all 
times. James Madison, speculating about the probable strength of 
each of the three branches of the new government, gave the palm to 
the legislature, which, in his judgment, tended to draw "all power 
into its impetuous vortex."1 His fellow. commentator, Hamilton, 
awarded third place to the Supreme Court, "beyond comparison 
the weakest of the three."2 The relatiorrship benveen national and 
state governments conceived by Madison envisaged the popular and 
powerful states as fully' capable of resisting national power; thus, 
the task of the newly established national government was to attract 
sufficient support to enable it to serve as a countenveight to the 
divisive tendencies of the states.3 
In tracing historically the relationships of each branch of the 
• Professor of Politics, Princeton "University; Visiting Professor of Law (1968-1969), 
University of Denver. A.B. 1940, Han·ard University; LL.B. 1947, Ph.D. 1951, Uni-
versity of Michigan.-Ed. 
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 333 ij. Cooke ed. 1961). In the same number, Madison 
obsened that "it is against the enterprising ambition of this department [the legisla-
ture], that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their pre-
cautions." Id. at .334. 
2. Id. No. 78, at 523. To Hamilton, the Court would "always be the least dangerous 
to the political rights of tl1e constitution •.• .'' Id. at 522. 
3. Id. Nos. 45, 46. 
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national government to the others, one notes both long-term and 
,short-term changes in the relative power of each. Certain Presidents, 
notably Jackson and Lincoln, expanded presidential power during a 
century marked by strong congressional action. The Supreme Court, 
under Marshall, strengthened national powers against state preten-
sions and established the Court's role as the pre-eminent interpreter 
of the Constitution. Yet, the Court was usually generous toward state 
action until the last decade of the nineteenth century, and the Dred 
Scott decision4 in 1857, which frustrated congressional efforts to 
compromise the slavery issue, marked only the second time the 
Court had faulted an act of Congress. 
The present century has been marked not only by short-range 
ebbing and flowing of executive power, but also by congressional 
acceptance of a largely ratifying and checking role in its relationship 
with the President.5 The twentieth century clearly is the age of exec-
utive initiative and administrative government. The great era of 
Congress lies in the past. 
To point out that the Supreme Court has also had a checkered 
career since the turn of the century is to state the obvious. Over the 
protests of Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and occasionally others, the 
Court read into the Constitution an economic and social philosophy 
which made it a frequent and effective censor of state and national 
legislation.6 Progressive political leaders increasingly viewed the 
Court, which allied itself in spirit with the dominant laissez-faire 
philosophy of powerful business leaders, as a barrier against needed 
social change. When the forces pressing for large-scale social reform 
found a powerful spokesman in Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Court 
was brought under siege. Although the President's ill-conceived 
Court-packing plan was defeated, the Court, sensing the dangers con-
fronting it, withdrew from its censorious role. The power to govern 
was returned to Congress and the President. No longer would the 
Court use the tenth amendment to frustrate national commerce and 
taxing power.7 Also abandoned was the ready use of the due process 
clauses to inhibit state and national social legislation.8 
4. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393. 
5. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS (4th rev. ed. 1957); J. HAluus, 
CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF .ADMINISTRATION (1964); R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
(1960); N. POWELL, REsl'oNSIBLE PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY IN THE UNITil> STATES (1967). 
6. E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT (1948); A. l\IASON, THE SUPREME COURT 
FROM TAFT TO WARREN (rev. ed. 1968); R. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 
ch. VI (1960). 
7. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
8. A. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE, esp. pt. V (1956); R. l\IcCx.osKEY, supra note 6, 
ch. VII; c. PRITcm:rr, Tm: RoosEVELT Coun.T '1948). 
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In the period from 1937 to 1953, the Court's role contracted as it 
proceeded to undo some of its earlier handiwork, concentrating on 
the staples of appellate review.9 For, even when its role is conceived 
in the most modest terms, the Court always has duties of the 
highest importance; interpreting and applying the provisions of in-
creasingly complex congressional enactments, review•ng decisions of 
myriad federal agencies, and resolving clashes of state and national 
power still leave the Court, in James Bradley Thayer's phrase, "a 
great and stately jurisdiction."10 But the post-1937 Court did not 
wholly abandon its role as censor. Other potentially explosive areas 
of judicial concern had emerged even before the Court revolution 
of 1937. First amendment issues involving the national government 
came before the Court as early as 1919,11 and with the Gitlow de-
cision12 in 1925, state actions affecting first amendment freedoms 
became amenable to Supreme Court review on the judicially 
evolved theory that the "liberty" protected by the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause included freedom of speech and, by im-
plication, the other enumerated rights of the first amendment. In 
1931 freedom of press,13 in 1937 freedom of assembly,14 in 1940 free-
dom of religion,15 and in 1947 the religious establishment provision16 
were incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. Since state and 
local governments had been far more diligent than the national 
government in suppressing dissenters and harassing unpopular mi-
norities, large-scale judicial intervention depended on the manner in 
which the Court chose to regard its new opportunities.17 
In the celebrated footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products 
Co.,18 Justice Stone suggested-in highly tentative language-that 
the Court might properly employ more stringent tests when review-
ing legislation or official. action that affected specific first amendment 
9. C. PRITCHEIT, CML Lm.ERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 240 (1954), concluded that 
"[t]he Vinson Court's solution was almost entirely within the tradition of the strong 
legislature-weak judiciary formula which Holmes developed for the quite different 
purpose of controlling judicial review over state economic legislation." 
IO. The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 
Hilv. L. R.Ev. 129, 152 (1893). 
11. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 
U.S. 47 (1919). 
12. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
13. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697. 
14. Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353. 
15. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296. 
16. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1. 
17. The opportunities were certain to arise because of the increasing public and 
legal activities of organized groups in the 1930's. See generally R. H0llN, GROUPS AND 
THE CONSTITUTION (1956). 
18. 304 U.S. 144, 1.52 (1938). 
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rights, restricted normal political processes, or focused upon "dis-
crete or insular" minorities. 
This conception of a preferred position for certain freedoms was 
firmly adopted by some of the Justices, particularly Black, Douglas, 
Rutledge, and Murphy, and was followed on occasion by others. In 
opposition, Justice Frankfurter, adhering to the teachings of his 
Harvard Law School mentor James Bradley Thayer, saw no reason 
to concede a preference to the Bill of Rights.19 Reiterating a polit-
ical philosophy expressed decades earlier, Frankfurter viewed the 
Supreme Court as an essentially undemocratic institution, one that 
should defer to the decisions of the representative branches on vir-
tually all occasions.20 With the exception of the second John M. 
Harlan, no other Justice in the modem era has foreswom judicial 
power in such positive terms. Although classed by most observers 
with Frankfurter and 'Harlan as "conservatives," Justices Jackson, 
Clark, Reed, Minton, Whittaker, White, Stewart, and Chief Justice 
Vinson were less impressed with the dangers of judicial interven-
tion; their numerous votes in support of governmental action re-
flected their conclusion that, on balance, such action was reasonable. 
Yet during the period from 1937 to 1953, there were three con-
stitutional areas in which the Court demonstrated particular in-
terest, and in many cases, invalidated governmental action. Jehovah's 
Witnesses won a number of triumphs, most notably in the second 
19. Speaking of the preferred-position concept, he argued that it was "a mfo-
chie,·ons phrase, if it carries the thought, which it may subtly imply, that any law 
touching communication is infected with presumptive invalidity." Kovacs v. Cooper, 
336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949). 
20. Justice Frankfurther's majority opinion in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitho, 
310 U.S. 586 (1940), and his dissent in West Virginia Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 
319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) are excellent examples of his antireview attitude. Arthur E. 
Sutherland suggests that between 1938 and 1943 a profound change in our political 
philosophy may have occurred, a revision of thought about majoritarian institutio 1s. 
All Sides of the Question, Felix Frankfurter and Personal Freedom in 2 FELIX 
FRA;-.;KFURTER: THE JUDGE 109 (W. Mendelson, ed. 1964). If this insight is correct, it h 
clear that Frankfurter remained a true believer to the end. Clearly the Justice ha~ a 
romantic and rather elementary conception of the role of _our representative institu• 
tions and the nature of their functioning, which seems surprising in one who was 
so close to the seats of power in the 1930's. But perhaps that experience served to rein• 
force his bias against judicial review, since Frankfurter's principal position was tl>at in 
a world of relative values the legislature was at least more representative than thc, 
Court. Frankfurter had written in 1934, "[T]he process of co!'stitutional interpretatio:i 
compels the translation of policy into judgment, and the controlling conceptions of 
the Justices are their 'idealized political picture' of the existing social order.'' Th: 
Supreme Court of the United States, in XIV E::-:CYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCL\L ScIE::cE:; 
424 (1934), reprinted in LAW AND POLITICS: FELIX FMNKFt:RTER 21, 30 (E. Pricha1c. 8: 
A. Macleish ed. 1939). Apparently he had little respect for _the argum<:Tit that Su:?rcrn~ 
Court Justices also have a representative role. 
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flag salute case.21 The Duncan case,22 invalidating martial rule in 
Hawaii during World War II, and Thornhill v. Alabama,23 drawing 
peaceful picketing under the protection of free-speech guarantees, 
were other libertarian victories. Second, by insisting on a realistic 
assessment of the "equality" afforded by "separate but equal" facili-
ties,2t and by stressing the importance of the intangible detriments 
flowing from a segregated education,25 th-e pre-·warren Court ren-
dered inevitable the decision in the school desegregation cases.26 Sim-
ilarly, the pre-Warren Court began in the 1930's to evince interest 
in the process of criminal justice in the states. As the Court chose to 
look more closely at the realities of criminal justice, it discovered 
that racial minorities and indigent and inexperienced defendants 
were subject to law enforcement and trial practices that fell short of 
due process of law.27 
Despite its new judicial concerns, it is fair to say that the pre-
·warren Court had slipped into a secondary role in the political 
system, and its decisions, on the whole, did not arouse serious public 
criticism. The decision in the steel seizure cases28 was popular, pri-
marily because President Truman's standing with the American 
people was not high. The decision upholding the convictions of the 
Communist Party leaders29 was widely applauded, as were other 
decisions supporting actions restricting Communists.30 
By 1953, then, when Earl ·warren stepped dovm as Governor 
of California to accept a recess appointment from President Eisen-
hower, the Court was already embarked on new judicial paths. But 
the nation, troubled by its thorny relations with the Soviet Union 
and frustrated by its seemingly inconclusive involvement in Korea 
only five years after the conclusion of a major war, seemed in no 
mood to deal forthrigh,tly with the pressing problem of civil rights, 
and reacted with some impatience to claims on behalf of political 
dissenters. And law enforcement agencies, as well as the public in 
general, had traditionally been hostile to more considerate treatment 
21. West Virginia Bel. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
22. Duncan v. Kahana.moku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). 
23. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
24. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
25. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950). 
26. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See R. HARRIS, THE QUEST OF 
EQUALITY (1960); C. PRITCHEIT, CIVIL LIBERTIES A.VD THE VL',SO:-. COURT ch. 7 (1954). 
27. See D. FELLMAN, THE DEFE:-.DA."<,'S RIGHTS (1958). 
28. Youngstown Sheet &: Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 T:.S. 579 (1952). 
29. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
30. American Communication Assn. v. Douds, 339 TJ.S. 382 (1950); Adler v. Board 
of Educ. of the City of New York, 342 U.S. 485 (1952), among others. 
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for criminal defendants, whether by overly generous judicial doc-
trine or the use of legal "technicalities." 
II. THE WARREN ERA 
President Eisenhower's nomination of Earl Warren as Chief Jus-
tice of the United States represented an awareness that the Supreme 
Court was, and necessarily remains, a political organ as well as a 
court of law. If legal experience and technical skill were prime 
requisites for a Justice or Chief Justice, it would have been difficult 
to justify the Warren appointment. Apart from discharging a major 
political debt, the appointment-concurred in by United States 
Attorney General Brownell and presumably by other leaders of the 
Eastern wing of the Republican Party-promised to bring to the 
Court a mildly liberal leader who could be counted on to play a part 
in reinforcing the image of no-nonsense, businesslike government 
which the new Administration hoped to maintain.31 
In the very first term of Warren's tenure the Court handed down 
its opinion in the school desegregation cases, 32 which had been be-
fore the Court in the last term of Vinson's leadership, onlt to be set 
for reargument in the following term. The predictable reaction to 
the Court's pronouncement in these cases and to the implementing 
decision that followed in 1955,33 despite the Court's unanimity, was 
a barrage of violent criticism from political leaders and other spokes-
men in the "deep South." More concrete resistance soon followed: 
legislative "interposition" resolutions were adopted, and various 
laws and administrative measures to thwart, or at least delay, im-
plementation of the Brown decision were enacted. Almost all South-
ern members of Congress joined in 1956 in issuing a "Declaration of 
Constitutional Principles," which concluded with an appeal for re-
sistance by "all lawful means."34 Other decisions applying the de-
segregation rule to various activities and facilities further inflamed 
Southern sensibilities. 
It cannot be overstressed that this violent and persistent attack 
on the Court by the political leaders of a substantial section of the 
nation has affected public reaction to other important Court de-
cisions. For here was a large, vocal minority eager to discredit the 
31. See the account of the appointment in J. "WEAVER, "\VARREN: THE MAN, THE 
COURT, THE ERA ch. 13 (1968). 
32. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
33. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294. 
34. The legal resistance is chronicled in various issues of the Race Relations Law 
Reporter. See also J. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND A?srERICAN LAW (1959). 
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Court in every conceivable way; and, given the range of contro-
versial subjects that inevitably challenged the Court, the opportuni-
ties for public denunciation were numerous. · In addition to the 
steaming racial issues, the Court had to pass on antiobscenity mea-
sures, the rights of criminal defendants, sit-ins and other controver-
sial forms of free expression, prayers and Bible-reading in schools, 
and questions involving apportionment and districting for state and 
national elections. \'\,'hen decisions favorable to individuals and 
groups claiming these rights were handed down, the Southern bloc 
could be counted on for bitter comment and intense efforts to in-
form news media of the disastrous consequences of the Court's chosen 
path.35 Because Southern Senators and Representatives held impor-
tant committee positions as a result of the seniority system, they were 
able to use Congress as a forum for their anti-Court crusade. Many 
non-Southern members of Congress, whose mood has been one of 
frustration arising from running battles with the bureaucracy, con-
stant presidential prodding, and widespread criticism of Congress, 
joined in the chorus of denunciation, eager to point the finger of 
blame at another institution. It was especially pleasant for Congress-
men to assume stances that were certain to please substantial num-
bers of constituents, and many of the Warren Court's decisions were 
unpopular with large segments of the population for reasons that 
seem obvious. How many citizens, after endless instruction that 
Communism was a great and imminent threat to the nation's secu-
rity, would applaud a decision favorable to Communists?36 And, 
clearly, the number of parents outraged by obscene literature ex-
ceeded the number of libertarians who applauded the Court's stand 
favoring literary freedom.37 Citizens who were alarmed by the grow-
ing crime rate were also quick to join the chorus of disapproval 
generated by law enforcement representatives. Millions of good peo-
ple were shocked by the decision banning prayers and Bible-reading, 
and only a massive counterattack beat off the effort to reverse the 
!15. The bitter struggle to curb the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is brilliantly 
described in W. MURPHY, Co~GRESS A.'m THE Cot:RT (1962), a work crucial to our 
understanding of congressional attitudes in the 1950's and 1960's. 
!16. See Stumpf, Congessional Response to Supreme Court Rulings: The Interaction 
of Law and Politics, 14 J. PL"B. L. 3i7 (1965) for a study of Court "reversal" bills in 
Congress. See also Lytle, Congressional Response to Supreme Court Decisions in the 
Aftermath of the School Segregation Cases, 12 J. PUB. L. 290 (196!1); Hearings on 
S. 2646, Limitation of Appellate Jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court 
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1958). 
37. See s. KRlsLOV, THE Sl"PRE:\{E COURT AND POLITICAL FREEDO:\{ !19-53 (1968) for an 
analysis of the antilibertarian cast of American public opinion. 
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Court by means of the Becker Amendment.38 Even the relatively 
-popµlar reapportionment decisions aroused militant opponents who 
stood to lose by a fairer system of representation.39 And of course, 
the cry of "states' rights" was raised not only in response to the 
desegregation decisions, but also in opposition to all decisions that 
found fault with state laws or practices. When the Conference of 
State Chief Justices issued its curiously unjudicial report in 1958/0 
ticking off grievances against the United States Supreme Court, it 
merely confirmed for many citizens their mm vague fear that in an 
increasingly confusing and rapidly changing world, the Supreme 
Court seemed determined to render innovative and therefore dis-
tressing decisions. 
In retrospect, it seems obvious that when the Court chose to 
hand down decisions favorable to racial minorities, political dissen-
ters, criminal defendants, and protagonists of unpopular causes, it 
could hardly expect cheers from the majority of people. Empirical 
studies of popular attitudes consistently reveal deep-rooted popular 
opposition to many provisions of the Bill of Rights, and ingrained 
hostility toward dissenters and advocates of change.41 Only strong 
stands by political and social leaders and by the popular media could 
offset this antilibertarian sentiment of the majority, but rarely were 
such stands taken. The Congress, as mentioned above, found the 
Court a convenient target. President Eisenhower assumed a remark-
ably dispassionate attitude toward the desegregation decisions, and 
withheld the massive reinforcement which the prestige of his name 
and office might have provided.42 Presidents Kennedy and John-
son were willing to speak out on racial matters, but, in the nature 
of politics, they could not be expected to defend the Court on every 
38. See Beaney & Beiser, Prayer and Politics: The Impact of Engel and Schcmp on 
the Political Process, 13 J. PUB. L. 475 (1964). Of course, the simple focused type of 
question may yield deceptive results; see the preliminary findings of Murphy & 
Tanenhaus, Public Opinion and the U1,ited States Supreme Court, 2 L\w & SOCIETY 
REv. 357 (1968). Giv::n an open-ended question about the Court concerning their likes 
;m;; 4;~iikes, the majority of respondents come up with nothing. Nevertheless, racial 
issues and school prayer, and to a lesser but growing degree, criminal-justice matters 
did evoke responses from a substantial minority. 
39. On the Dirksen Amendment campaign see R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTA-
TION (1968) chs. 15, 16; Dixon, Article V: The Comatose Article of Our Living Con-
stitution, 66 MICH. L. REV. 931 (1968). 
40. Report of the Committee on Federal-State Relations as Affected by Judicial 
Decisions. 
41. See S. KrusLov, supra note 37. 
42. See R. HARRIS, supra note 26, at 155-57. That "you cannot change people's heo.rts 
merely by laws," was one of President Eisenhower's cherished beliefs. J. '\VEA\'m'., 
supra note 31, 2.t 217. 
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issue.-t3 The American bar, which furnished heroic support to the 
embattled Cour.t of the 1930's, has, on the ·whole, taken a less 
sympathetic position toward the Warren Court, which it views as 
too controversial and excessively disrespectful toward precedent. 
It has often been remarked that the Court should, and usually 
does, follow the election returns. The argument is that although the 
Court is not an elective body, it must in its mm way behave as a 
representative institution. If one takes this argument seriously, the 
Warren Court has, perhaps, been wrong on most of the controversial 
issues for which it has provided answers. If the function of the Court 
is to please the majority and displease as few groups and interests as 
possible, then Chief Justice Warren and the other politically sophis-
ticated members of the Court have badly misconceived theh- role 
and deserve the criticism that they have received. Bnt there is another 
view of the Supreme Court's role that casts the work of the Warren 
Court in a more favorable light. If the role of the representative 
branches is to give voice to-as well as shape and lead-public 
opinion, it may well be the proper function of the Supreme Court 
to voice the best aspirations of our people, to give reality to the 
ideals we profess in our Constitution and Declaration of Indepen-
dence, and to provide justice for those who otherwise have difficulty 
claiming it. Who can deny that a viable society requires reasonably 
prompt and appropriate attention to important social problems? It 
is the Court, not the representative branches, which has tried to 
eliminate the racial cancer which still threatens America. Only well 
after the Court's first efforts did Congress and the President see fit 
to act. And, without traversing the ground covered in other Articles 
in this Symposium, is it not clear that the dominant theme running 
through the other controversial decisions of the ·warren Court is 
the necessity of equal rights for all, protection of the underdog, and 
respect for the dignity of man in a confusingly complex society? One 
can, of course, argue that the "\Varren Court has tried to move 
fon\'ard on too many fronts in a period of social change and unrest. 
A cautious political strategist might conclude that in the light of the 
troubles stirred up by the desegregation decisions, the Court would 
have been wiser to allow Bible-readings and prayers in the schools, 
avoid restrictions on the police, assist in the crackdown on smut 
4!1. President Kennedy's espousal of a comprehensive Chi! Rights Act in 196!1, 
enacted into law under President Johnson in 1964, might be regarded as the great 
exception. But Congress was driven, not led, to this action in 1964 and to other rights 
bills in subsequent years. By 1968 all had returned to normal. 
352 Michigan Law Review 
peddlers, let Communists take their lumps, and stay out of the reap-
portionment thick.et; but the Court has chosen a more embattled 
way. 
Writing in 1941, Robert H. Jackson observed that the Supreme 
Court was "almost never a really contemporary institution .... The 
judiciary is thus the check of a preceding generation on the present 
one; a check of conservative legal philosophy upon a dynamic peo-
ple; and nearly always a check of a rejected regime on the one in 
being."44 The mistake of the Warren Court, according to its critics, 
is that it insists on moving too fast-on advancing far beyond the 
:1.eeds and expectations of the present generation. One of the most 
perceptive commentators has warned that the Court should not 
i.gnore history "in determining how judicial control should be exer-
cised and when it should be brought to bear." Surely, he admonishes, 
''the recora teaches that no useful purpose is served when the judges 
seek all the hottest political caldrons of the moment and dive into 
the middle of them."45 It is hardly a daring speculation to suggest 
that a post-Warren Court may move somewhat cautiously in the con-
servative atmosphere of the late 1960's. Yet, the doctrines of equality, 
freedom, and respect for human dignity laid down in the numerous 
decisions of the Warren Court cannot be warped back to their orig-
inal dimensions. The attitude of more and more Americans, particu-
larly the members of the young and better-educated generation, is 
one of intense commitment to human rights. Generations hence it 
may well appear that what is supposedly the most conservative of 
American political institutions, the Supreme Court, was the institu-
tion that did the most to help the nation adjust to the needs and 
demands of a free society.46 
44. THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 315. 
45. R. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 229 (1960). 
46. Archibaid Cox has written: 
Only history will know whether the Warren Court has struck the balance right. 
For myself, I am confident that historians will write that the trend of decisions 
during the I950's and I960's was in keeping with the mainstream of American 
history-a bit progressive but also moderate, a bit humane but not sentimental, 
a bit idealistic but seldom doctrinaire, and in the long run essentially pragmatic-
in short, in keeping with the true genius of our institutiom. 
THE WARREN COURT 133-34 (1968). 
